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they made such a distinction they might decide the question themselves as one
of clear-cut assumption of risk, while it is properly a matter for the jury under
a negligence instruction. It may be that in a popular sense one who patromzes a
beauty culture school for her hairdos "assumes the risk" of certain injuries, but
this means only that she takes a chance by placing herself in the hands of one
held to a lower degree of skill than a licensed operator. These cases at law should
hinge on the jury question of whether the student was negligent, and not on
assumption of risk.
GEORGE CREEDLE
EQUAL FACILITIES IN LEGAL EDUCATION UNDER THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE - EPPS V CARMICHAEL
Plaintiffs, who were Negro citizens and residents of North Carolina possessed
of requisite qualifications for admission to the Law School at the Umversity of
North Carolina, had applied there for admission. They were refused on grounds
of their race and color and because North Carolina had provided a Law School
for Negroes at the North Carolina College where they also had applied and had
been admitted as law students. Plaintiffs prosecuted a class action against the
President of the Umversity and others to restrain the defendants from refusing to
admit them. The Federal District Court held for the defendants, deciding that
the College Law School afforded the required "separate, but equal, facilities."
The court found that there would be no substantial advantage to the parties to be
admitted to the Umversity Law School, and that the disadvantages at the College
Law School for Negroes were more than offset by the disadvantages existing at
the Umversity Law School. Epps v. Carmichael.'
In Sweatt v. Painter,- another recent case involving the right of a Negro to
enter a white law school, the United States Supreme Court held that the legal
education offered the Negro petitioner in Texas was not substantially equal to that
which he would receive if admitted to the Umversity of Texas Law School; and
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that he
be admitted to the Umversity of Texas Law School.
In both Texas and North Carolina, the legislatures had provided for segrega-
tion and forbade the attendance of Negroes at schools for white children.3
The action of a state in denying a citizen the opportunity to acquire a legal
education on the highest level, deprives him of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the Sweatt case' the trial court continued the petitioner s case for six months
to allow the state to supply substantially equal facilities. A law school was then
hurriedly established and the Texas trial court found that the new school satisfied
the Fourteenth Amendment by offering petitioner privileges, advantages, and op-
portunities substantially equivalent to those offered by the state to white students
at the University of Texas. The Supreme Court reversed the Texas decision be-
93 Fed. Supp. 327 (W.D. N.C. 1950).
339 U.S. 629 (1950).
'Johnson v. Board of Education, 166 N. C. 468, 82 S.E. 832 (1914). TEX.
CONST. Art. VII, sees. 7, 14; THx. RE.v., Civ. STAT. arts. 2643b (Supp. 1949) 2719,
2900 (Vernon, 1925).
' Sweatt v. Painter, supra, note 2 at 633.
NOTES ON RECENT CASES
cause it found that the Negro school was not substantially the equivalent of the
University of Texas Law School.
A faculty of sixteen full-time and three part-time professors staffed the Um-
versity of Texas Law School. Some of these were nationally recognized authori-
ties in their fields. By contrast, the law school for Negroes at Texas State Un-
versity had only 5 full-time professors. At the white law school there were 850
students, whereas, there were only 23 Negroes at Texas State. The libraries con-
tained 65,000 volumes and 16,500 volumes, respectively. Among the other facili-
ties available to the white students were a law review, a moot court, scholarship
funds, and Order-of the Coif affiliation. That school's alumnim occuply the most
distinguished positions in the private practice of law and in the state s public life.
Indeed, the University of Texas is one of the nation s ranking law schools while
the law school for Negroes was unaccredited, although on the road to full ac-
creditation; and had, by way of facilities, only a practice court and legal aid associ-
ation and only one alumnus who had become a member of the Texas bar.
In comparing the two schools, Chief Justice Vinson said in the Sweatt case:
" we cannot find substantial equality in the educa-
tional opportunities offered white and Negro law students by the
State. In terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses, and
opportunity for specialization, size of the student body, scope of the
library, availability of law review and similar activities, the University
of Texas Law School is superior. ' 5
In addition to discussing the objective factors, Chief Justice Vinson placed
great emphasis on the fact that the University of Texas Law School was capable
of instilling those qualities which cannot be objectively measured but which make
for greatness in a law school. He stated:
"Such qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of
the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence
of the alumm, standing in the community, tradition and prestige. It is
difficult to believe that one who had a free choice between these law
schools would consider the question close."'
The Supreme Court did not find equality in the Sweatt case, taking into con-
sideration all the aforementioned objective and subjective factors. Deciding that
the Negro petitioner was not afforded Equal Protection under the Law, the Su-
preme Court required that he be permitted to enter the University of Texas Law
School.
In the Epps case, the United States District Court considered the objective
factors in comparing the white North Carolina University Law School and the
College Law School for Negroes and stated that the disadvantages at the College
Law School were more than offset by disadvantages at the University Law School.
Id. at 634. It will be noticed that the teacher-student ratio at the Negro
school was one teacher to five students; while at the University of Texas it was
one teacher for every 44 students. It is doubtful that the Negro law school was
in a better position than the University of Texas law school because of the smaller
number of students per professor if one realizes that most of one s legal education
is not gained under immediate supervision of a law professor but by careful read-
ing and classroom discussion and lecture. If a small ratio were advantageous, then
the old legal educational system of studying law under a practicing attorney in his
office should be better than our present system of class instruction.
aIbid.
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Discussing the relative merits of the two North Carolina schools, the Court found
that the law school of the University of North Carolina was established by the
State about the year 1900, and has a present enrollment of 280 with a faculty of
10 professors. In comparison, the law school of North Carolina College for
Negroes at Durham was established in 1989, and was organized by the man who
was Dean of the University Law School at that time. The curricula, teaching
methods and facilities were patterned after those at the University and the on-
ginal faculty was composed of the professors from the University and the Duke
University Law Schools on detached service. In 1941 the present dean was
employed as a teacher and assistant dean and a well-qualified, full-time Negro
faculty of five men was secured. In addition, Professor McCall of the law faculty
of the University and Professor Bryson of the Duke University Law School con-
tinued as part-time teachers. The enrollment at the College Law School during
the past year was 28 students.'
The Court compared the objective factors in every respect. It found that
housing facilities at both schools were inadequate, although plans were being
executed for radical changes at both institutions. Furthermore, it was shown that
the Law Building at the University was severely overcrowded, whereas at the
College Law School class rooms were large enough to accommodate far more
students than the school had enrolled.
Comparing the respective law libraries the Court said:
"While the library- at the University Law School con-
tains approximately 64,000 volumes, two-thirds of these are crated
up and not available for use. Many of them are duplicate sets. There
are 17 complete sets of the North Carolina Reports, not to mention
the broken sets. The library at the Negro College Law School con-
tains 30,000 volumes and contains a variety of books which makes
it a first rate library."'
The Court further found that while the University Law School had a law
review and a Chapter of the Order of the Coif, the College Law School had
neither of these. The LL.B. degree, of course, was conferred by both institutions;
however, in addition to this the University Law School conferred the S.J.D.
degree. As concerns accreditation, the Law School at the University of North
Carolina was approved by the American Bar Association and the Association of
American Law Schools, while the College Law School was approved by the
American Bar Association and was on the verge of admittance to the Association
of American Law Schools, having met the requirements of the latter. The North
Carolina Board of Examiners approved both of the law schools.
The student-teacher ratios in the North Carolina schools were one pro-
fessor to 28 pupils at the white law school and one professor to three pupils at
the Negro school.
Although it was stated in the opinion of the Epps case that the curricula at
the Negro law school was patterned after that of the white law school, it will be
found on examination of their respective school bulletins that the University of
North Carolina Law School offers 31 second and third year subjects totalling 83
credit hours while the North Carolina College at Durham offers only 17 second
and third year courses totalling 55 credit hours.
'Supra, note 1, at 329. The University of North Carolina Law Library is in
not quite as bad a condition as the Court made it appear. By the time of publi-
cation of this note about 20,000 of the stored volumes will be out of storage and
available for use while the remainder will be uncrated sometime in the future.
NOTES ON RECENT CASES
Men with experience in the orgamzation and adminmstration of law schools
testified as to the infenorities of the College Law School, while others, equally
qualified, testified as to the equality of opportunity for a legal education there.
However, in spite of a split on the part of these who testified, it can be seen that
the Law School for Negroes was more nearly equal to the University Law School
than was the Negro school in Texas to the Umversity of Texas Law School.
Although a case for equal but separate facilities might be made out if only
the strictly objective factors are considered, we must further consider some fac-
tors that are equally important although not as tangible-the factors that were
considered by the Supreme Court in the Sweatt case.
In this important case Chief Justice Vinson placed emphasis on the fact that
barring the petitioner from the University Law School would require him to
attend a college which excludes from its student body members of the racial
groups which number 85 per cent of the population of the state and which in-
clude most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with whom
petitioner would inevitably be dealing upon becoming a member of the Texas
Bar. In the words of the Court:
"With such a substantial and significant segment of so-
ciety excluded, we cannot conclude that the education offered to the
petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would receive if ad-
mitted to the Unversity of Texas Law School."" [Italics our own]
But in the Epps case the court in North Carolina said:
"There is no evidence before the Court to show that a
Negro lawyer attending the University of North Carolina would en-
joy a higher standing with the Judges, and lawyers, and litigants,
and jurors, and witnesses than he would enjoy if he attended the
College Law School. I would not think that it would make the
slightest difference with a judge who is fit to sit on the bench, nor
should it have any appreciable effect on the jurors who are sworn to
do their duty according to the evidence in the case.""0
Perhaps this declaration of the North Carolina federal court overlooks certain
practical realities, when one considers that the legal profession is one that places
great emphasis on tradition and precedent. Furthermore, even if a judge or jury
is impartial as to where a lawyer obtained his education, how can they avoid
being partial to the lawyer who presents his case better as a result of more ade-
quate legal training. It seems apparent that a legal education in a segregated law
school is not as adequate as it would be if it were given on a non-segregated
basis. This same idea appears to underlie the decision in the Sweatt case, if one
reads between the lines; while in the Epps case the Court declares:
"" and the courts throughout the country have very
generally held that equality of opportunity in education can exist
where segregation is practiced."" [Italics our own]
It is interesting, then, to speculate on how the Supreme Court would handle
the principal case. Chief Justice Vinson s language in the Sweatt case seems to
suggest, at least, that equality in legal education cannot exist where segregation
'Sweatt v. Painter, supra, note 2, at 634.
" Epps v. Carmichael, supra, note 1, at 330.
U Ibid.
" Sweatt v. Painter, supra, note 2, at 634.
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is practiced. Despite the fact that in other fields of educational endeavor the
Equal Protection Clause seems to be satisfied by duplication of educational facili-
ties, vet as concerns legal education Vinson declares:
"The law school, the proving ground for legal learning
and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and
institutions with which the law interacts. Few students and no one
who has practiced law would choose to study in an academic va-
cuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of
views with which the law is concerned." [Italics our own]
This language implies that the separation of Negro law students from white
law students and from the association with the major racial group will be detn-
mental to their fullest accomplishment in their study of the law, because of the in-
trinsic and peculiar nature of the law. If the above excerpt is more than mere
dictim it may well be said that the United States Supreme Court will reverse
the North Carolina District Court's decision in the Epps case should that case
appear on appeal before the high Court. Such a reversal would be based on
something deeper than a mere consideration of the plant facilities of the two
schools, namely, that because of the very nature of the subject there can be no
real equality in the study of the law where segregation exists.
MYER S. TuLKOFF
RIGHT OF CHILD OF SLAYER TO INHERIT FROM SLAYER'S
VICTIM - BATES V WILSON
In Bates v Wilson a son killed his father and mother, the father dying first.
His property was devised to his wife. She died intestate immediately thereafter
leaving as possible heirs her murderer, the murderer s daughter, and another son.
The slaver s daughter, by her guardian, claimed the interest in her grandparent's
estate that her father would have taken had he not murdered them. Held: The
daughter is entitled to such interest since the slayer "should be considered as
though he had preceded in death the person whom he killed."'
Before discussing the problem presented, we must look to see whether the
slayer could himself take from his benefactor. At common law, a majority of
states allowed an heir who killed to take from a person who died intestate.3 The
reason for this majority view, as stated in a Kentucky case, ' is that, since the
statutes of descent and distribution make no exception for such a situation, the
courts should not imply one. A few courts give as a basis for so holding the
constitutional and statutory provisions against forfeitures for crime.' However, a
strong minority even without a statute refused to allow a slaying heir to take
'Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888); Hagna v. Cone, 21
Ca. App. 416, 94 S.E. 602 (1917); Wall v. Pfanschimdt, 265 IlM. 180, 106 N.E.
78b (1914); McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 P. 112 (1906); Eversole v. Ever-
sole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S.W 487 (1916); Gillnik v. Mengel, 112 Minn. 349, 128
N.W. 292 (1910); Shellenberger v. Ransom 41 Neb. 631, 59 N.W 935 (1894).
'313 Ky. 572, 232 S.W 2d 837 (1950).
Id. at 575, 232 S.W 2d at 838.
'Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S.W 487 (1916).
'See Whitney v. Lott, 134 N. J. Eq. 586, -- 36 A. 2d 888, 890 (ch. 1944).
